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On Ethics and Decision Support Systems Development 
Rob Mereditha and David Arnottb 
Decision Support Systems Laboratory, School of Information Management & Systems, Monash University 





The ethical aspect of decision support systems (DSS) is an important area of concern for 
developers and users alike. Such systems impose frameworks and structures upon the 
cognitive decision making process to a greater or lesser extent, requiring the developer to 
anticipate, if consideration is given at all, the ethical questions that the decision maker might 
face. However, the level of research in DSS ethics is disturbingly low. We turn to the area of 
medical decision support where the four bio-ethical principles of beneficence, non-
maleficence, autonomy and justice have been identified as a useful framework for ethical 
medical DSS. We believe this framework is useful for DSS in general, and present a call to 
arms for further research into DSS ethics. 
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Primum non nocere 
(Above all, do no harm) 
Galen, c. 130CE – c. 201CE 
Introduction 
When decision makers are faced with a decision situation, they often have to contend with a 
number of competing factors to make a ‘good’ decision. Not the least of these is whether the 
outcome of the decision process is in accord with not only their values and principles, but 
whether they fit into the broader values and principles of other stakeholders and society at 
large. Ethical decisions are something that most of us strive for. 
Decision support systems (DSS) is the area of the information systems discipline that is 
devoted to supporting and improving managerial decision-making. Over time the majority of 
DSS research has focused on the application of new technology to managerial tasks at the 
operational and tactical management levels (Eom & Lee, 1990; Mallach, 2000; Raghavan & 
Chand, 1988). In terms of contemporary professional practice, DSS includes personal 
decision support systems, group support systems, executive information systems, online 
analytical processing systems, data warehousing, and business intelligence (Shim et al., 
2002).  In this paper we will be focusing specifically on personal decision support, that is, 
systems designed to aid an individual decision maker (or at least a very small number thereof) 
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with a single specific decision task, and the ethical issues that developers need to grapple 
with in undertaking this kind of development. 
Given the importance of ethical decision making, consideration of ethical issues related to the 
tools that support that decision making is also important. Whilst ethics and information 
technology in general has been discussed for a number of decades now, there is very little 
material addressing the specific ethical issues related to supporting decision makers with 
technology. Perhaps not so surprisingly, it is the application of DSS technology to medical 
decisions that has received the greatest attention from ethicists. Given that the debate in 
medical DSS is so much more advanced than DSS in general, drawing as it does on the vast 
body of work in bio-ethics, we believe that it may be useful to adopt the ethical principles 
governing medical practice as a tool to help us understand the principles of ethical DSS 
practice. 
The Nature of Decision Support Systems 
Decision support systems generally address ill-structured decisions that are of considerable 
importance for the decision-maker and the organisation. It is almost impossible a priori to 
specify the system requirements in such an environment. In some cases, the requirements 
problem is alleviated somewhat when the personal DSS is developed by the user themselves.  
This saves explicitly expressing the tacit task understanding developed by the user during 
requirements elicitation and system use.  In this paper, however, we concentrate on personal 
DSS where the user and developer are distinct people. 
The environment of DSS is subject to significant change and even if the system requirements 
have been specified with some accuracy at the start of the project they are likely to change 
significantly over time. This system change can occur because of changes in personnel, 
organization structure and processes, external competitive pressures, and most importantly, 
changes in the decision maker’s cognitive strategies and task understanding. Systems analysts 
tend to adopt an evolutionary development strategy to cope with this environment. 
Evolutionary development in decision support was first hinted at by Meador and Ness (1974) 
as part of their description of middle-out design. This was a response to the top-down versus 
bottom-up methodology debate of the time that concerned the development of transaction 
processing systems. Courbon et al. (1978) provided the first general statement of evolutionary 
DSS development. In what they termed an “evolutive approach”, development processes are 
not implemented in a linear or even in a parallel fashion, but in continuous action cycles that 
involve significant user participation. As each evolutive cycle is completed the system gets 
closer to its final or stabilised state. Courbon argued that the evolutive cycles should be 
continuous and as rapid as possible as DSS exists in an environment of continuous change. 
The functionality of DSS is thought to evolve over a series of development cycles where both 
the client and the systems analyst are active contributors to the shape, nature and logic of the 
system. Keen’s adaptive design model (Keen, 1980) is the most cited exposition of this cycle. 
Evolutionary development remains at the core of current DSS textbooks (Mallach, 2000, for 
example). 
Within this evolving systems environment the user of a DSS has considerable autonomy with 
respect to how they make a decision and what support they receive. This places the DSS 
systems analyst in a very different relationship with the client than their colleagues who 
develop operational systems. The ultimate users of operational systems tend to be low in the 
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organisational hierarchy and have no choice as to whether they use the system or not and have 
no involvement in the design and development of the system. The technologies available to 
the DSS have multiplied over the last 20 years (Power & Kaparthi, 1998). In addition to 
spreadsheet, modelling, and database tools, DSS are constructed using executive information 
systems (Suvachittanont, Arnott, & O'Donnell, 1994), OLAP tools (Thomsen, 1997), data 
warehouses (Gray & Watson, 1998), and the World Wide Web (Kimball & Merz, 2000). 
The nature of support provided by these different technologies can be characterised according 
to a continuum of passive through to normative support (Jelassi, Williams, & Fidler, 1987; 
Keen, 1987), with most systems sitting somewhere in the middle. Passive decision support 
tends to place the emphasis more on the decision maker to control the decision process, 
whilst normative support imposes a structure and process on the decision maker regardless of 
their preferences or normal style of work. Passive support tends to consist of the provision of 
information to the decision maker, leaving it to him or her to assimilate and manipulate that 
information to arrive at an appropriate course of action. Normative support adopts decision 
theoretic principles and enforces an ‘ideal’ process that in many cases takes the decision 
maker out of the loop. Knowledge-based systems are classic examples of this approach to 
support, where the system itself makes a judgement on the best course of action given certain 
inputs. Most decision support systems, however, tend to sit somewhere in the middle, 
providing some of the structure and process support of normative systems whilst attempting 
to retain the important element of the human decision maker in the process, ensuring that 
learning takes place that enables the decision maker to make better decisions in the future. 
These systems that offer more structured support whilst still respecting the autonomy of the 
user to control the process are labelled ‘active’ decision support by Keen (1987). Active 
decision support implies a more overt intervention into the decision process, which exposes 
the developer to a range of ethical issues. 
Ethics and Information Technology 
As a profession, information technology is still in its infancy, when one compares to, say, 
law, medicine, architecture, or even engineering or education. A large focus of the discussion 
on the relationship between ethics and information technology has necessarily been on the 
role of the developer or practitioner as an ethical professional. Mason (1995), for example, 
argues that the practitioner needs to carefully consider the decisions that they make in the 
light of the broader impact upon society. Laudon (1995) argues that technology is as much a 
part of society (and therefore as ethically laden) as any other social phenomenon. For 
example, the issue of technology putting people out of work is pointed to as an impact that 
some developers and system owners fail to consider. This debate was particularly virulent in 
Australia in the 1980s when the proliferation of automatic teller machines was having an 
impact on the number of bank employees and branches. The typical approach to the issue of 
the practitioner as a professional is the establishment of professional bodies and associations, 
and codes of conduct, and there are a number of theoretical frameworks for tackling how one 
develops such a code (Walsham, 1996, for example). 
However, ethical issues extend beyond due diligence on the part of the IT professional during 
development. The social impact of technology needs to be considered, and issues such as 
privacy (including users and third parties), the availability of paedophilic material, copyright 
protection and advertising on the Internet are examples of the kinds of issues society at large 
needs to consider – not just practitioners (Berleur, Duquenoy, & Whitehouse, 1999; Conger 
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& Loch, 1995). In these cases, the moral responsibility for the social impact of technology 
extends beyond just the practitioner: when considering the use and purpose of technology, the 
responsibility resides with system owners and clients, and in some cases, users as well. This 
is particularly so when technology is immorally or illegally utilised by users (Banerjee, 
Cronan, & Jones, 1998). 
Whilst a large part of the moral responsibility for the use of technology belongs with system 
owners and users, it often falls to the practitioner, as a professional, to highlight potential 
ethical issues in proposed systems. Unfortunately, many IT professionals lack the 
communicative skills, and the ethical training to be able to engage in an ethical dialogue 
(Conger & Loch, 1995). 
The locus of responsibility is a fundamental issue for ethics and technology. Indeed, the idea 
of moral responsibility sits at the cornerstone of any ethical debate. Without responsibility for 
an action residing with a person, then we cannot label the action (and its outcomes) as good, 
bad or otherwise. They are ‘happenings’ or accidents rather than moral acts. We see this 
principle at work in the legal system, where it is incumbent upon a plaintiff or prosecutor to 
demonstrate intent or mens rea on the part of the defendant. 
With technological ethical issues, we can see that it can be quite difficult to apportion blame 
or responsibility when there are so many different actors and stakeholders. The determination 
of that locus will differ from project to project, system to system, issue by issue. It seems 
apparent, however, that it is beholden on the IT practitioner, as an expert professional, to 
ensure that such issues are explored prior to, rather than during or after, an ethical dilemma, 
and that the relevant actors and decision makers are aware of their responsibilities. 
This is more important for some kinds of systems than others. Whilst bank automatic teller 
machines, or supermarket bar-code scanners, can have a social impact in that they may put 
people out of work, their use on a day-to-day basis tends not to raise any other particular 
ethical issues. However, where systems are designed to undertake actions autonomously of 
their developers, owners and users, or where a system contributes significantly to a decision 
made by a user, then a large range of potential ethical dilemmas might arise. This is of 
particular interest to computer scientists interested in the field of artificial intelligence. Lucas 
(2001) and Dowling (2001) both point out that Asimov was one of the first to codify a set of 
rules for autonomous systems, albeit fictionally, with his laws of robotics. 
Responsibility implies autonomy and free will. The corollary of this is that autonomy and free 
will carry with them moral and ethical responsibility. If an artificially intelligent system 
makes a decision, and causes an action to result, who bears the moral and ethical 
responsibility? The programmers? The system owners? No artificial intelligence system yet 
has the actual intelligence to comprehend ethical and moral dilemmas and make appropriate 
decisions, but given that the programmers and/or owners have ceded some control and 
development of the system to the system itself, it can be difficult to lay the responsibility 
solely at their feet. The concepts of autonomy, trust and responsibility become more 
problematic as the system is more active in the decision making process (Dowling, 2001). 
Ethics and Decision Support Systems 
Whilst decision support systems do not, generally, adopt the same level of autonomy of 
systems discussed by AI philosophers, they do, to a greater or lesser extent, usurp or impose 
structures upon the autonomy of a human decision maker. The ethical issues faced by 
decision support systems, therefore, are a super-set of the issues for non-autonomous 
Meredith R A & Arnott D R Ethics and DSS 
7th Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems, 10-13 July 2003, Adelaide, South Australia       Page  1566
information technology. Given the popularity of data warehouse, business intelligence and 
other decision support systems, it is unfortunate that the ethics of decision support as a 
specific topic has received very little attention in comparison to the issues of privacy and 
other general IT ethics issues.  
Indeed, there is a major gap in the literature on this topic. A search of the journal Decision 
Support Systems on the Science Direct website (http://www.sciencedirect.com) for the 
keyword ‘ethics’ in the abstract, title or key word list of any article since the January 1995 
edition (vol.13, no.1, the earliest edition available on the site) yielded zero results. A more 
extensive search of the entire text of each article from the same period only yielded ten 
papers, none of which addressed the topic of ethics directly. A search for the same term in 
either the citations or abstracts of articles in Decision Sciences on the Proquest website 
(http://www.bellhowell.infolearning.com/proquest) yielded just one result: a paper published 
in 1981. This paucity of published research and debate on the ethics of decision support in 
two of the discipline’s premier journals is disappointing. 
This doesn’t mean that the topic has been ignored totally. Some of the issues raised include 
the fact that a decision support tool embodies a particular philosophical approach to decision-
making - for example, is it ethical to quantify certain values, such as those we place on 
human life, or how we manage risk (Johnson & Mulvey, 1995)? Johnson & Mulvey also 
address the issue of the locus of responsibility for outcomes resulting from decisions made 
based in part on advice provided by a decision support tool. Their answer to the question is 
that the developer should have similar responsibilities as any other professional or expert who 
is hired for their advice. That is, developers should bear responsibility for the quality of the 
advice their systems provide, including raising and establishing standards and norms for the 
ethical use of their systems. 
A related issue to that of the system embodying a particular philosophical approach to 
decision making, is whether or not the correct decision is being supported, raised by Chae, 
Courtney and Paradice (2002). They point out that not only is the design of a decision support 
system not value neutral, it is actually “heavily value laden”. Since values have an important 
role to play in determining whether or not a situation should even be considered a problem, 
let alone what an appropriate solution might be, ignorance of the various stakeholder value 
positions in a decision problem can, in fact, lead to the wrong problem being supported. 
Involvement of various stakeholders in the decision is important during DSS development to 
ensure that this doesn’t happen. 
The issues discussed by Johnson and Mulvey, and Chae, Courtney and Paradice are relevant 
regardless of the kind of decision support tool or approach. However, as discussed earlier, the 
more control over a decision a support tool has, the more relevant the issue of responsibility 
becomes. Fox (1990), addresses the issue of expert systems, specifically those used for 
safety-critical decisions such as those in nuclear power plants, or hospitals. In these cases, the 
system has a significant level of autonomy to make decisions and undertake corresponding 
actions. If an ethically questionable decision is made, the moral culpability potentially resides 
with the system itself. To address this dilemma, Fox suggests that all decisions made by a 
safety-critical expert system should be subject to possible human intervention. That is, the 
system should be flexible and robust, to deal with as many unforeseen permutations of the 
decision task as possible, as well as being accountable to a human decision maker. This 
allows the moral responsibility to reside with an entity that is morally accountable. 
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Ethics and Medical Decision Support 
It is perhaps not surprising that the most significant contribution to ethics and decision 
support comes from the medical fraternity. For a long time, medical practitioners have 
utilised a number of different tools and technologies to support either diagnosis or treatment, 
often relying on other people to operate and interpret the output of these tools. Examples 
include radiologists, pathologists, physiotherapists, and all manner of specialists, each of 
whom provide expert advice that contributes either to diagnosis or treatment of a medical 
problem. The recent increase in the consideration of medical ethics, partly attributable to the 
patient rights movements and increased malpractice litigation, has meant that the role that 
others play in the decision making process has been closely considered (see Goodman, 1998, 
for example). This, in turn, has meant that the ethical aspects of tool use, including medical 
decision support, has been scrutinised more than it has for decision support systems in 
general. 
With so many potential participants in the typical medical decision-making scenario, the issue 
of the locus of responsibility is just as problematic, if not more so, than for ethics and 
information technology. As Snapper (1998) points out, the responsible entity in a scenario 
where a physician, patient, specialist, medical technician and a medical device are all 
involved in the decision making process is very difficult to determine. It could be any of the 
people or companies involved in the development, use, ownership and maintenance of 
medical devices, as well as the attending physician. When one adds into the mix the fact that 
the device may be autonomous and be replacing a responsible human professional (Snapper 
points to the example of heart monitors), the issue of just who is ethically and morally 
responsible for an action becomes highly problematic. 
In the case of computational devices where a decision is either made by the system, or based 
on the output thereof, Snapper suggests that the solution is to adopt a similar view to the 
situation where a physician relies on advice from non-computerised sources such as human 
consultants. In these situations, responsibility is shared amongst the various professionals. 
This doesn’t, however, answer the issue of who exactly is responsible in the case of 
autonomous computer systems. It seems counter-intuitive that a computer system or any other 
tool, lacking consciousness, could be held morally responsible for the outcome of a decision 
that it supports. 
One solution is to ensure that final accountability for a decision lies with a conscious, 
competent, intelligent agent. That is, the autonomy of a human decision maker must be 
respected (Abbott, 2001; Collste, Shahsavar, & Gill, 1999; Fox, 1993; Miller & Goodman, 
1998; Snapper, 1998). That might mean a human supervisor or reviewer in the case of more 
prescriptive systems such as expert systems (Fox, 1993), or recognising the idea that a 
decision support tool is designed to enhance the autonomy of, rather than replace, a human 
decision maker, in the same way that a stethoscope enhances, rather than replaces hearing 
(Miller & Goodman, 1998). Snapper provides some empirical support for the argument that 
decision support tools that provide control of the judgement process are preferred by decision 
makers. In a study of diagnostic support tools, physicians preferred those tools that provided 
recommendations along with case histories, rather than numerical probabilities of the 
correctness of a particular diagnosis. Whilst it is possible that the former type provided better 
‘peace of mind’ for the physician in terms of justification of the recommendation, Snapper 
argues that it allows for at least the impression of greater control over the judgement process. 
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Miller and Goodman make the assertion even stronger, stating that a medical decision support 
tool should never replace a human decision maker: “It must be possible for the user to 
interpret and even override the data generated through the use of … a decision support 
system.” They point out that there are two corollaries of this. The first is that user interface 
issues are very important since the ability of the user to interpret the output of a decision 
support tool is directly related to the way in which that output is presented. The second is that 
users of a decision support tool should be appropriately trained to understand the use and 
output of the system, just as users of other diagnostic tools such as imaging equipment 
undergo training in their use and interpretation. They further state that inappropriate use of 
decision support systems occurs, not only when the users misunderstand the applicability of 
the system to a particular situation, but also when such systems intrude in a negative way 
upon the social structures in place that are designed to assist in the decision making process. 
The autonomy of people in the decision situation is restricted “when we allow socially 
productive and respectful relationships to be sullied, or their participants to be taken 
advantage of.” In a field where positivism and normative decision processes are dominant, we 
see recognition of the fact that technology must be subordinate to social, humanist 
considerations. 
In their discussion of the ethical aspects of a DSS for diabetes care, Collste et al (1999) 
highlight autonomy of the decision maker as important, but go further and point to the four 
principles of bio-ethics described in Beauchamp and Childress (1989): beneficence; non-
maleficence; autonomy; and justice. Whilst Collste et al were specifically discussing medical 
decision support, we believe that there are enough parallels with general decision support 
systems development to argue that these four principles should apply there as well.  Certainly 
medical decision support systems tend to be a sub-class of personal decision support – there 
are usually only one or two users of such as system, which is targeted towards a specific 
decision problem.  In the section below, we will show that these four bio-ethics principles can 
be applied, to a greater or lesser extent, to personal DSS at large. 
Another reason for our belief that these principles are applicable is that, of all classes of IT 
professional, the personal DSS analyst comes closest to being a combination of clinician and 
practitioner. This is because the development process is client and problem centred; the 
development is oriented to decision pathology and health; development involves charging 
fees for services; and the ethical/legal responsibility is to avoid malpractice (Schein, 1987, 
p.68). The personal DSS analyst tends to work with a small group of clients (usually one) and 
forms closer professional relationships with them than developers of large scale operational 
systems. 
Another distinguishing feature of DSS development and use is the impact of the system upon 
the cognitive strategies and structures of the user. Whilst an operational system has some 
impact upon its users in terms of understanding and task approach, the degree to which a DSS 
has an impact on the user’s cognitive strategies and structures is much greater due to the 
uncertain, unstructured nature of the task. The intervention of a DSS developer or decision 
analyst into the life of a decision maker is, whilst generally not as strategic as the life and 
death interventions that a physician might be called upon to perform, similar to the 
intervention of a physician to a patient. The principles governing ethical practice on the part 
of physicians are a useful lens, therefore, for understanding the principles that should govern 
DSS practice. 
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Four Ethical Principles for DSS 
Beneficence and Non-Maleficence 
Whilst Beauchamp & Childress argue that these are separate principles, they are essentially 
complementary concepts. Literally, beneficence means to ‘do good’, whilst non-maleficence 
means to ‘do no harm’. One is an act of commission, the other one of omission, both aimed at 
ensuring that, in the medical setting, the ‘good’ for the patient is maximised. Beauchamp & 
Childress specify four directives that can be derived from these two principles: 
1. One ought not to inflict evil or harm (non-maleficence) 
2. One ought to prevent evil or harm (beneficence) 
3. One ought to remove evil or harm (beneficence) 
4. One ought to do or promote good (beneficence) 
Certainly, our aim as decision support systems developers is to assist decision makers as 
much as possible. Within the context of a decision problem, we would try to see that any 
intervention on our part has a positive, rather than a negative effect. As professionals, we 
should avoid introducing negative factors or processes like complexity or exacerbating the 
cognitive biases of the decision maker (Arnott, O'Donnell, & Grice, 1993). This holds true 
whether the negative influence is as a result of our own actions (directive one), a result of 
external contextual factors (directive two), or as a result of some characteristic of the decision 
maker themselves (directive three). Our aim, as professionals, should be to always “do or 
promote good”, whilst minimising any negative influences on the decision maker. 
Undoubtedly, DSS have a role to play in assisting decision makers – this is, after all, their 
raison d’etre. Beauchamp & Childress, however, highlight an interesting point about the 
nature of beneficent acts. That is, it is a fine line between acting with beneficence, and 
slipping into paternalism. This has relevance, particularly for the more prescriptive 
approaches to decision support, including expert and other relatively autonomous systems.  
Even if, in our view as developers, we are satisfying the principles of beneficence and non-
maleficence by removing complexity, or minimising the effects of cognitive biases or other 
negative influences, we may in fact be impinging upon the autonomy of the system user as a 
decision maker. Our actions can have more than one consequence, and we must be as aware 
as possible of the full consequences of our actions. It is only in the light of this more 
complete assessment of our actions that the principles described here should be considered. 
As we will see, the autonomy of DSS users is important. Unfortunately, a paternalistic 
approach is not unusual when technologists attempt to act in accordance with the principles 
of beneficence and non-maleficence. As a result, in the long term, these principles can be 
defeated. 
Autonomy 
Autonomy is ultimately about respecting the right of an individual or group to self-
determination. Not only is this important as a fundamental human right, it also is a pre-
requisite for ethical and moral responsibility. The criminal justice system, as mentioned 
earlier, places a great deal of importance on the difference between someone acting 
autonomously, and someone whose actions where the result of influences beyond their 
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control. In the latter case, otherwise criminal acts are considered to be either less severe (eg. 
manslaughter versus murder), or are dismissed as criminal altogether. In a political and social 
sense, there are countless examples of the individuals and groups whose autonomy has been 
impaired, resulting in gross violations of the beneficence and non-maleficence principles. Just 
as autonomy is important in the political and social arena, it is a fundamental principle that 
should underlie support for all decisions, medical or otherwise. Just as physicians should 
uphold the autonomy of their patients to ensure that their rights are respected, decision 
support systems developers should uphold the autonomy of the users of their systems to 
decide for themselves their own course of action. 
Beauchamp & Childress state that there are three important criteria for an act to be considered 
autonomous: 
1. The act had to be intentional, a result of an exercise of the will, implying competence 
on the part of the decision maker to make decisions. 
2. The act had to be a result of a decision based on informed understanding. 
3. The act had to be free of controlling influences. 
In other words, autonomy has aspects of competence, where the decision maker has the 
requisite skills and abilities to make the decision to act; information, including disclosure to, 
and understanding by, the decision maker such that they have an informed understanding of 
the situation and the consequences of acting; and consent, in that they voluntarily commit to 
the action decided upon. Decision support systems directly impact upon all three of these 
criteria. 
It is perhaps easiest to see this for the first two criteria of competence and informed 
understanding. Where decision makers lack the skill to make a decision, or process 
information in such a way as to achieve an informed understanding, a decision support tool 
can help provide the structure to walk the decision maker through the decision process, or 
augment the information processing abilities of the user to comprehend fully the decision 
situation. 
The second criterion of informed understanding has long been a goal of decision support. 
Keen argued in 1980 that user learning, where a DSS user gains insight and understanding 
into and about the decision problem, is an integral part of successful DSS development, as 
shown in his now famous framework for adaptive DSS development (Keen, 1980). He goes 
so far to say that if any of the aspects of the framework are missing, including the user 
learning loop, then the system is not a DSS in the true sense of the term. 
The third criterion, that of being free of controlling influences, poses some problems for a 
DSS, since it is, in itself, an influence upon the decision-maker. Indeed, if the system or tool 
had no influence, it would not be of any use. Clearly, the third criterion requires some 
modification, and Beauchamp & Childress acknowledge this by arguing that the third 
criterion can never really be achieved. They argue that the standard should be an act free of 
excessive controlling influences, that is, a decision maker should be satisfied themselves that 
they are voluntarily exercising their free will, without the sense that they are being 
manipulated or forced to do something that they don’t wish to do. In enhancing a decision 
maker’s autonomy by assisting them through augmenting their information processing 
abilities, or guiding them through a decision process, a DSS shouldn’t become an excessive, 
controlling influence. In other words, in an effort to boost the autonomy of the user, the 
support provided doesn’t descend into paternalism, thereby actually reducing the autonomy of 
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the decision maker. Collste et al (1999) also state that, whilst a DSS can assist in boosting the 
autonomy of a decision maker, that is by no means guaranteed. 
As Silver (1988; 1991) points out, the finite processing limitations of any decision support 
system lead to restrictions on the decision-making abilities of the user. Whilst these may be 
of little or no consequence in many cases, few developers stop to consider that they are 
directly impacting the cognitive structures of the users of their systems. Indeed, the 
paternalistic approach to decision support is alive and well, as evidenced by the following 
from a recent text on data warehousing (Craig, Vivona, & Bercovich, 1999, p.321): 
Standard reports can be an asset to an organisation because they limit the 
choice for users when it comes to researching decisions. By telling the users 
what they should be looking at, the designer of the standard reports removes 
the burden of deciding what is important and what is not. 
Clearly, this attitude is one of paternalism and if adopted, abrogates the autonomy of the 
decision maker to determine for themselves “what is important and what is not.” In such a 
situation, it would be feasible to argue that the developers shoulder the ethical responsibility 
for the consequences of decisions based upon the output of their systems. That is, the locus of 
responsibility for decisions made by the decision maker shifts to the developer. 
This is not to say, however, that all systems that adopt a paternalistic approach to decision 
support are necessarily unethical. It may well be that the user wants this level of support and 
structure. Having someone else decide for you what is important and what isn’t removes a lot 
of the complexity from a decision situation. However, the relinquishment of the right to 
autonomy must be the prerogative of the user, never a result of a unilateral decision of the 
developer. A paternalistic system developed to meet the user’s needs respects and maintains 
the user’s autonomy only if the user’s decision to adopt such an approach itself meets the 
criteria for autonomy. 
Justice 
Beauchamp & Childress discuss justice from within a health context, and look at issues of 
equality of access, fairness, and allocation of health resources. Of the four principles, justice 
is perhaps the least relevant to decision support, particularly individual as opposed to 
organisational decision support. That being said, the themes of equity and fairness do have 
implications for decision makers, particularly when these decisions have a social or strategic 
policy making aspect to them. By extension, especially for active and normative decision 
support, issues of social justice, equity and fairness are relevant. For example, the nature of 
decision support provided will have an impact on the role that stakeholders other than the 
decision maker, if any, play. The broader social issues of technology use referred to in the 
section above on Ethics and Information Technology are also encompassed by the concept of 
justice. 
Concluding Comments 
Ethics is not a side issue for DSS development. It should pervade every aspect of 
development, deployment and use of the system, covering not only professional conduct on 
the part of the developer, but consideration of the impact the system has on the user, and 
other stakeholders in the system and the decisions made relying upon it. 
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The paucity of research in this area, however, is disappointing and problematic. Apart from a 
small number of conference papers, there is almost no academic consideration of the issue. It 
is not enough to rest on the laurels of the work done on ethics in IT in general – the nature of 
DSS development and use mean that there are significant differences to other IT systems. 
First, the development process itself is quite different, being much more collaborative in 
nature. The relationship between the user and developer is generally much closer than in 
other systems development. The scale and length of projects is also generally much smaller 
and more ‘intimate’. This is so that the second major difference can be catered for, that is, 
that the nature of DSS and the development process is a much more invasive intervention 
than for other systems. The collaborative nature of the development process and the 
intrusiveness of the intervention mean that there are a number of significant similarities 
between DSS developers and clinicians. 
Neither can we rest upon the laurels of the ethical work in medical DSS, a result of the more 
advanced status of debate on ethics in medicine. The discussion has not translated across to 
DSS at large, as that work has been carried out by medical researchers and published in 
medical journals such as Methods of Information in Medicine. At the very least, if there has 
been any interaction between DSS and medical researchers, it has not translated into 
published research on ethics within the business DSS domain. 
Beauchamp & Childress’ principles of bio-ethics are not the only possibly useful framework 
for tackling DSS ethics. However, given the strong similarities between clinicians and DSS 
developers, we believe that the four principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy 
and justice provide insight into the many ethical aspects of DSS. This paper, therefore, is 
something of a call to arms for researchers to develop the area with both philosophical, as 
well as empirical treatment. 
It is important that further work be done.  Whilst we have specifically addressed personal 
decision support systems in this paper, we can’t see any significant reason why the ideas here 
could not be broadened to include the other kinds of decision support mentioned in the 
introductory section – at the very least, it bears further investigation.   
In terms of future research, we propose a four phase agenda, with each phase consisting of 
one or more research projects in itself.  First is a need to refine and develop the framework 
conceptually.  A more rigorous literature review, including a stronger input from the field of 
ethics is needed.  Further conceptual development will allow expansion of the framework to 
include the other types of DSS described in the introduction.  This will lead to a refined 
conceptual model of an ethics of decision support. 
The second phase is to canvas input from DSS developers.  Professional input will ground the 
model in the kinds of issues that are faced in DSS projects, and provide extra face validity.  
The third phase will be to take this model and test it in situ.  This third phase could test a 
number of hypotheses.  We believe that DSS developed with these ethical principles in mind 
will be more successful from the perspective of user satisfaction and system use, than would 
otherwise be the case. 
Finally, with an empirically refined and validated set of principles, there is a need to see these 
principles put into use in practice.  Broadly speaking, there are two approaches.  The first is to 
evangelise to existing developers.  This can be achieved through a number of methods, such 
as presentations, lectures, seminars, articles in practitioner journals, training courses, and so 
on.  The second is to educate up-and-coming developers to think about ethical issues.  This 
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involves modification of course syllabi in universities at both the undergraduate and 
postgraduate levels. 
 
Phase Methodologies Outcome 




2. Empirical Validation / 
Refinement 




3. Application to Practice • Case Study 
• Ethnography 
• Surveys 
Ethical framework for 
professional DSS 
practice 
4. Evangelism / 
Dissemination 
• Training 
• Syllabus development 
• Seminars 
• Lectures 
• Trade press articles 
• Books 
• Etc. 
Ethically trained and 
aware DSS developers 
Table 1.  Research Agenda. 
This paper is therefore a call to action.  Whilst we will be continuing work on this research 
agenda, this paper is also a call for a healthier debate amongst the practitioner and academic 
DSS community.  As academics, we have a responsibility to initiate and foster this very 
important discussion. 
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